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Abstract. This article contrasts two common cognitive approaches employed by United States (US) 
politicians in furthering human rights throughout the world. 
 
Human rights can be defined as fruits of life that people should be able to enjoy just by virtue of being 
people. When these fruits are denied, human rights violations are said to occur. As opposed to civil 
rights--much more dependent on social, cultural, and political tradition and authority and conceived as 
routes to human rights--human rights often are thought to transcend the temporal and the situational. 
This is the case even though a close reading of history certainly suggests that conceptions of human 
rights have changed in different parts of the world at different times in different situations--as has the 
very notion of there being anything conceived as human rights. To suggest otherwise is to fall victim to 
the historiographical fallacy of reinterpreting the past through the socially constructed realities of the 
present. 
 
One common cognitive approach to furthering human rights is to reify the concept as the be-all and 
end-all of human welfare. As part of this reification, not only is the same conception of human rights 
assumed to be required or desired everywhere, but also this conception is sought to the virtual 
exclusion--if necessary--of all other goals of human welfare. A related corollary is that these other goals 
of interhuman and intrahuman welfare will fall into place once human rights are assured. This corollary 
contains an implicit theory of psychology that the goals of human welfare are symmetrical. The 
dynamics of psychodynamic conflict do not exist. Neither do the approach-approach conflicts of 
behaviorist motivational theory. 
 
In foreign policy, this cognitive approach renders the conception of human rights and governments’ 
compatibility with it as a litmus test that must be the linchpin of foreign relations. Inconsistency with 
this litmus test renders even that politician with the most benign intentions as an accomplice in mortal 
sin. Human welfare demands this to be the case. 
 
Another common cognitive approach to furthering human rights is based on a different implicit 
psychology--that the goals of human welfare can be asymmetrical and conflictual. With this approach 
the conception of human rights is but one of a number of positives--others involving the many aspects 
of physical, psychological, and spiritual beneficence. (The fact that some human rights advocates state 
that human rights comprises all of these aspects may work against the advocates' goals. For to have a 
concept mean everything is to have it mean nothing. And the something that this nothing will entail can 
too easily be managed by the most totalitarian of governments to develop a humane image belied by 
the human welfare of its citizens.) 
 
In foreign policy, this cognitive approach requires, depending on circumstances, a continual balancing 
act, a strategic-moral calculus in an ever-changing world, and the waxing and waning of the objectives of 
furthering human rights and of developing and employing consonant strategies and tactics. What is 
consistent is the quest for human welfare. But consistency in all related matters will be more suggestive 
of stupidity, ignorance, sloth, and immorality than of a shining point of light. 
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In the best of hands, the first approach can too easily become automatic, instinctive, mindless, self-
righteous, avoidant of and resistant to questioning, and generative of consequences that cumulatively 
may not be the most supportive of human welfare. In the best of hands, the second approach often is 
more psychologically and spiritually taxing, more complex, and, perhaps, more open to the 
consequences of policy. 
 
In a world of change, inconsistency in policy, strategy, and tactics is not necessarily a vice. For human 
rights advocates to charge otherwise may be their human right but also a human wrong. (See Carozzi, A. 
F., Bull, K. S., Eells, G. T., & Hurlburt, J. D. (1995.) Empathy as related to creativity, dogmatism, and 
expressiveness. Journal of Psychology, 129, 365-373; Harries, O. (October 26, 1997.) Virtue by other 
means. The New York Times, p. E15; McCormick, J. M., & Mitchell, N. J. (1997.) Human rights violations, 
umbrella concepts, and empirical analysis. World Politics, 49, 510-525; Orton, R. E. (1995.) Ockham's 
razor and Plato's beard: or "The possible relevance of the philosophy of mathematics, and the problem 
of universals in particular, to the philosophy of mathematics education, and the problem of 
constructivism in particular." Journal of Research in Mathematics Education, 26, 204-229; Woloshyn, V., 
& Stockley, D. B. (1995.) Helping students acquire belief-inconsistent and belief-consistent science facts: 
Comparisons between individuals and dyad study using elaborative interrogation, self-selected study, 
and repetitious-reading. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 9, 75-89.) (Keywords: Cognition, Human Rights, 
Typology.) 
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